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This article examines the place of Australian and local content regulation in the new media 
policy framework proposed by the Convergence Review. It outlines the history of Australian 
content regulation and the existing policy framework, before going on to detail some of the 
debates around Australian content during the Review.  The final section analyses the relevant 
recommendations in the Convergence Review Final Report, and highlights some issues and 
problems that may arise in the new framework. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Almost every aspect of the contemporary media landscape appears to underline the limitations 
of current Australian policies for media content and communications services. The broadband 
internet; the mobile internet; new patterns of consumer behaviour; new global media 
businesses; new national digital strategies; cloud-based media; the rise of user-generated 
content: all of these represent new and complex challenges to the once-familiar world of the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (BSA), and its many accretions. It was therefore a positive 
step when, in late 2010, the Australian Government commissioned the Convergence Review. 
The Review’s brief was to examine the current policy framework and regulatory objectives, 
recommend a new framework and advise on the principles that will underpin it. This would 
involve analysis, condensation and revision of the most relevant pieces of legislation, the 
BSA, the Telecommunications Act 1997 (TCA), the Radiocommunications Act 1992 (RCA), 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 (the ABC Act), and the Special 
Broadcasting Service Act 1991 (the SBS Act). Although not made explicit in the Review until 
the release of the Emerging Issues paper in July 2011, one of the motivations behind the 
process was the desire to ensure that ‘legacy policy frameworks should not hamper 
convergence, investment and choice in the marketplace’ (OECD 2008, 2). The implication 
here that ‘legacy policy frameworks’ might not only need to be amended, but scaled back in 
order to encourage innovation and competition was directly incorporated in the first of the 
principles established by the Review committee to guide its work. This principle states: 
‘Citizens and organizations should be able to communicate freely, and where regulation is 
required, it should be the minimum needed to achieve a clear public purpose’ (Convergence 
Review 2011b, 8). The Review’s deregulatory brief was reinforced by the publication of two 
reports by the Australian Communications and Media Authority. The first, entitled Broken 
Concepts: The Australian Communications Legislative Landscape, discussed the relevance 
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and utility of 55 legislative concepts deemed to ‘form the building blocks of current 
communications and media regulatory arrangements’ (ACMA 2011a, 5). The companion 
report released in November 2011 entitled Enduring Concepts: Communications and Media 
in Australia (ACMA 2011c) sought to identify the concepts that would underpin relevant 
regulation in the emerging convergent media environment. In its Final Report (Convergence 
Review 2012), the Review acknowledged that there remain areas in which government 
intervention in the public interest is justified and necessary. Three areas in particular were 
nominated for ongoing oversight and action: media ownership and control; content standards; 
and Australian content production and distribution. The last of these is our concern in this 
essay. 
 
Australian content regulations and mechanisms to support production and distribution have 
been core components of media policy for many years. With the advent of media convergence 
and digitisation, access to the means of production and distribution is now more widely 
available. These factors have reduced production costs for some if not all content, [1] and at 
the same time they have expanded the venues and modes of cultural production, blurring the 
distinctions between amateur and professional content producers/distributors upon which 
much support and regulation has traditionally been based. This new configuration requires 
policymakers to face two questions. First, should the existing mechanisms and frameworks be 
amended or replaced in order to achieve the cultural objectives that have traditionally 
underpinned content regulation? And second, are the forms of Australian content that 
traditionally have been the beneficiaries of media policy and regulation on the basis that they 
make significant contributions to Australian national and cultural identity – principally long-
form drama, documentary, children’s programming, and news and current affairs – the only 
forms that should be supported in the digital environment, or should other forms including 
games and non-professional media content (forms of user-generated content), also benefit 
from content regulations, subsidies and incentives?  In part, the answers to these questions 
depend on the extent to which intervention is intended to support and maintain the 
accessibility of professionally produced Australian content.  If the objective is merely to 
provide broad access to such forms of Australian content, then attention will focus on 
regulations or incentives to support or enable its widespread production and distribution.  If, 
however, the principle acknowledges that a broad variety of forms of content can contribute 
to the development of national and cultural identity, then the objective must be to 
acknowledge and facilitate widespread participation in content production and distribution. 
Before exploring how these questions were discussed during the Review, and then analysing 
how the Final Report answers them, it may be useful to recount briefly the evolution of the 
regulation of Australian content in broadcasting. 
 
HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN CONTENT REGULATION 
 
Kim Dalton, currently Head of Television at the ABC, observed in 2007 that the history of 
Australian content in broadcasting has been a history of regulation (Dalton 2007). As the 
Productivity Commission noted in its Broadcasting Inquiry Report (2000, 379), the objectives 
of such content regulation ‘are cultural and social rather than economic’. And yet the 
regulation of Australian content in broadcasting has historically had significant economic 
implications for broadcasters, for producers and for the Australian government. Indeed it can 
be argued that the imposition of Australian content regulations on commercial broadcasters 
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has been a response to those broadcasters’ economic imperatives, with intervention justified 
in terms of ‘market failure’. That is, the fact that much Australian content costs more to 
produce and distribute than the cost of licencing imported content is a disincentive to 
investment by commercial broadcasters.[2] But since Australian content is considered to serve 
important social and cultural functions, market distortion in the form of broadcast quotas and 
production subsidies has been deemed reasonable. 
 
The first such measure was introduced in the Broadcasting Act 1942, when a 2.5% quota for 
Australian-composed music was imposed on commercial radio broadcasters.  The quota was 
increased in 1956 to 5%, and in 1973 a 10% quota for Australian-performed music was added 
to the mix. Three years later, this quota was increased to 20%. Under the terms of the 
Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (2005), the Australian music quota was capped at 25% 
although quota levels vary for different music genres. In 2010, despite music industry 
protests, the Australian government waived content quotas for digital-only radio stations for 
three years. 
 
Content quotas were first imposed on Australian commercial television broadcasters in 1961 
in response to what the government considered to be unacceptably low levels of Australian 
programming. Television stations that had been established for at least three years were 
required to screen Australian programs for 40% of total transmission time, and to screen at 
least one hour per week of Australian programming in prime time (which at that time was 
deemed to be 7.30-9.30pm). The following year, the prime time quota was increased to two 
hours per week. In 1964, UK programs were permitted to fill 5% of the total quota, which was 
increased to 45% of transmission time. It was raised again in 1965 to 50%. In 1967 the prime 
time quota was lifted to twelve hours every twenty-eight days (including two hours of drama), 
with children’s programs included for the first time. Two years later the prime time quota rose 
to eighteen hours per twenty-eight days, and was amended again in 1971 to 45% of 
programming between 6 and 10pm, including at least six hours of first release Australian 
drama per twenty-eight days. The following year, 1972, the prime time quota was raised again 
to 50% of broadcasts between 6pm and midnight, before the overall quota was replaced in 
1973 with a points system based on program type, cost, employment and length.  Following a 
public inquiry in 1990, the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal introduced an overall quota of 
35% of total transmission time for Australian programs, with the level increasing by 5% per 
year until 1993. Points systems for first release drama and six ‘diversity’ program categories 
were introduced in 1990 before being overhauled in 1996 when a new definition of 
‘Australian content’ was applied and a quota was introduced for first release Australian 
documentaries of ten hours per year in prime time. In 1998 the overall quota increased to 55% 
of transmission time between 6am and midnight. That next year, following a High Court 
judgment that Australian content standards were inconsistent with Australia’s Closer 
Economic Relations agreement with New Zealand, programs made in New Zealand were 
made eligible as Australian for content purposes [Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting 
Authority [1998] HCA 28]. 
 
The subscription television sector also has local content obligations. Since 1999 — and before 
that on a voluntary basis — certain designated drama channel providers have been required to 
spend at least 10 per cent of their total programming expenditure on new Australian drama 
productions, which could be feature films or television programs. According to ACMA, in the 
2010-11 reporting period, the subscription television industry spent $33.5 million on 
Australian and New Zealand drama programs in meeting its obligations under this scheme.  
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One of the initial objectives of both radio and television content regulation was to nurture the 
Australian music, film and television production industries.  A requirement introduced in the 
1956 Broadcasting and Television Act that Australians be employed in the production and 
presentation of television programs remained in force until 1995. In advertising, the 
Australian quota for commercial television introduced in 1960 was explicitly intended to 
nurture the development of a domestic production industry. In its 2000 Broadcasting Inquiry, 
the Productivity Commission took the view that while support for the production industry was 
a consequence of the content regulation system outlined in the Broadcasting Services Act 
(1992), this was not its principal purpose. The Inquiry’s report noted that ‘The stated rationale 
for Australian content policy is the promotion of social and cultural objectives, not assistance 
to the local production industry’ (Productivity Commission 2000, 384). Over a decade later, 
in a changed media environment, the Convergence Review took a different approach. 
Reinforcing the guiding principle first outlined in the Framing Paper published in February 
2011, the Review’s Emerging Issues paper not only affirmed the importance of Australians 
having access to Australian content, but added a new principle which stated that this content 
‘should be sourced from a dynamic domestic content production industry’ (Convergence 
Review 2011b, 9). The subsequent Discussion Paper on Australian and Local Content 
conceded that ‘[m]aintaining a particular level of activity for the content production industry 
is not a stated objective of the current regulation’, but went on to note that ‘it is generally 
accepted that if production activity is not maintained at a level that supports professional 
employment then the cultural and social objectives of Australian content regulation cannot be 
achieved’ (Convergence Review 2011, 6). There are two problems with this reasoning. First, 
it leads to the view that it is the current production industry, with all its particular strengths 
and weaknesses, that is necessary to the social and cultural objectives, although of course this 
is not so, especially in a period of rapid change. Second, the fact that one cannot have local 
content without local production should not mean that local production becomes, by default, 
the policy priority. If it does, there is a clear risk that, where they diverge, the social and 
cultural objectives will take second place to industry support. In our view, this is what has 
occurred in the Convergence Review.  
 
DEBATING AUSTRALIAN CONTENT REGULATION IN THE REVIEW 
 
At an early stage, the Review outlined its view that existing regulation built around industry 
‘silos’ and addressed to the particularities of different platforms and networks has been 
rendered obsolete by new technologies, market structures, business practices and 
audience/user behaviour. In place of the unique policy frameworks governing broadcasting, 
telecommunications and radiocommunications, the Review suggested an approach previously 
described by ACMA (ACMA 2011a, 6). This approach would ‘recognise new market 
structures as a series of “layers” created by convergence, including the underlying 
infrastructure which transports the content, the network which manages and directs the 
content, the specific content or application and the device upon which the content is assessed’ 
(Convergence Review 2011b, 12). Following from this, and informed by the concepts of fair 
competition and technology neutrality, the Review indicated that its subsequent work and 
ultimate recommendations would be guided by the concept of ‘regulatory parity’, or equal 
treatment of content and services. Although many submissions supported this general 
approach, many also pointed out that for various reasons ‘regulatory parity’ might not best 
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serve the objective of ensuring the production, distribution and availability of Australian 
content. 
 
Australian content regulations have been imposed on broadcasters and not on other media and 
content providers in large part because of the principle that the type and weight of regulation 
applying to a service should be proportional to that service’s degree of influence over 
community opinion and outlook. Without much in the way of empirical analysis, television 
broadcasting has historically been considered the most influential medium, and has therefore 
borne the heaviest burden in terms of content regulation. Free to air television broadcasters 
are more heavily regulated than subscription television broadcasters, principally because of 
the former’s larger audience reach. The public service broadcasters, ABC and SBS, are not 
currently subject to the same regulations as their commercial counterparts, much to the latter’s 
dismay. And at present, television-like services on the Internet, via catch-up services run by 
broadcasters both in Australia and internationally, internet protocol television (IPTV), and 
file-sharing networks, are not subject to any of these regulations or codes of practice. 
 
Many submissions to the Review, particularly from industry, argued strongly against the 
extension of Australian content rules to convergent platforms on the grounds that the 
imposition of content rules in order to achieve some kind of regulatory parity could 
potentially have a chilling effect on innovation and competition.[3] At the same time, 
however, recent research by the ACMA shows high levels of public support for Australian 
content rules for Internet services. ACMA’s Digital Australians online survey found that 84% 
of respondents agreed that it was somewhat/quite/very important for the Australian 
government to put in place rules to ensure that high-quality Australian content is available on 
the Internet (ACMA 2011b, 62-3). This is lower than the equivalent figure for television 
(92%) (ACMA 2011b,  62). But importantly the demographic registering the highest level of 
agreement with the proposition that it is important for rules to be put in place to support the 
availability of Australian content on the Internet is the 18-29 group. This is the demographic 
that recorded the highest levels of online video content consumption, the highest level of 
catch-up television viewing over the Internet, the highest level of offline and online viewing, 
and the highest level of online-only viewing (ACMA 2011b, 12-13).[4]  That is to say, the 
group that is most engaged with online content is also the group that is most supportive of 
regulatory intervention to ensure the availability of Australian content on convergent 
platforms. It is, however, by no means clear that what this group wants would be the kind of 
content favoured by the Convergence Review — focus groups conducted by ACMA as part of 
the same research appear to have emphasised the importance for them of Australian 
information online, rather than content resembling traditional television.  
 
In August 2011, the Review released a set of discussion papers, including one on Australian 
and Local Content. This paper canvassed a range of issues, including the underlying rationale 
for supporting Australian content production and distribution, support for new content forms, 
and options for future content regulation. The paper made explicit the link between the 
‘significant cultural benefits’ flowing from Australian media content – principally ‘a stronger 
sense of national identity, the promotion of social cohesion, and cultural diversity’ – and the 
need for government support to ensure that such content would not be ‘under-produced’ 
(Convergence Review 2011a, 7). The ‘special place in the content ecosystem’ of drama, 
documentary and children’s content was foregrounded, with the former in particular framed 
as ‘arguably the most artistically rich content [with] the greatest capacity to tell complex 
stories and convey important social, cultural and political messages’ (Convergence Review 
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2011a, 7).  Despite the suggestion that a case could be mounted against the elevated status of 
drama, at no point did the Review research or explore this question, or provide detailed 
reasons for its position. When the Final Report appeared in April 2012, the qualification 
‘arguably’ had disappeared; it is asserted as self-evident, without justification or equivocation, 
that ‘Drama contains the most artistically rich content and has the greatest capacity to tell 
complex stories and convey social and cultural messages’ (Convergence Review 2012, 59). 
The ultimate rationale for government intervention came down to the cost of producing these 
genres, and the reluctance of commercial broadcasters to fund and screen them without 
specific requirements. 
 
The Review acknowledged in the Discussion Paper, albeit again prefaced as an arguable 
proposition, that the cultural objectives of Australian content policy ‘could also be supported 
by Australians participating in social media or interactive environments such as virtual worlds 
or games’ (Convergence Review 2011a, 10). Participants were invited to comment on 
whether policy measures should be implemented to promote these newer forms of content. It 
was clear, however, from the limited discussion of these newer forms in the Discussion Paper 
that the Review did not consider them on a par with the traditional genres of drama, 
documentary and children’s content. This would be reflected in the recommendations 
contained in the Final Report. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify the Review’s preferences and ultimate 
recommendations in the questions posed in the Discussion Paper around particular content 
forms and types of regulation. The final recommendation to phase out the commercial 
television content quotas (albeit after a transitional period in which they would be increased 
and also imposed upon the public service broadcasters), and institute a minimum expenditure 
model to all media platforms along the lines of that applying to subscription television, can be 
projected from the ways in which the questions are framed in the Discussion Paper.  And, as 
would become more obvious in the Final Report, the Review was clearly taking a lead from 
the October 2011 submission by Screen Australia (2011), which outlined most of the options 
for Australian content that appear in the Final Report’s recommendations. 
 
In December 2011 the Review released its Interim Report (Convergence Review 2011c), 
which outlined the key areas for legislative and regulatory reform. These broadly followed the 
areas covered in the five Discussion Papers: media diversity, competition and market 
structure; layering, licensing and regulation; spectrum allocation and management; 
community standards; and Australian and local content. In the subsequent round of 
submissions, the Interim Report was criticised by many participants for the lack of detail in its 
recommendations. Many of these submissions also took issue with specific proposals outlined 
in the Interim Report, although when the Final Report was made public at the end of April 
2012 – a month after its presentation to the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the 
Digital Economy – almost all of the recommendations remained intact. 
 
THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Fourteen of the Final Report’s thirty recommendations relate directly to the regulation of 
Australian and local content on screen and radio, by commercial, community and public 
service enterprises.  Several of the sixteen remaining recommendations also have the potential 
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to affect the regulation of Australian and local content, and we will turn to these first.  
 
The proposal to create a new regulator to replace the existing Australian Communications and 
Media Authority has a number of implications, not least in its powers to ‘apply, amend or 
remove regulatory measures as circumstances require’ (Convergence Review 2012, xvi).  
These regulatory measures will obviously include those governing the production and supply 
of Australian and local content.  The new regulator will also potentially impact Australian 
content regulation via its responsibilities to address changes in industry structure and to 
oversee the new content and communications regulatory policy framework.  
 
This framework is built around the concept of a ‘Content Service Enterprise’ (CSE), a new 
term to cover those entities ‘involved in supplying content services’ (Convergence Review 
2011c, 5) including, potentially not only broadcasters and print media companies based in 
Australia, but also those based overseas if they supply into the Australian market. The new 
framework is focused on regulating ‘significant’ enterprises, with significance determined by 
their ‘potential to influence’ (Convergence Review 2012,  7), as well as on the services they 
provide. This is a significant departure from the present system of media and communications 
regulation, which is organised around the level of influence of the particular delivery 
platforms on which those services are delivered.   
 
In the new system, an enterprise’s ‘potential to influence’ will be determined by the new 
regulator, with particular attention paid to its reach in terms of the number of users of the 
content it controls across all platforms and services, and by the size of the revenue it draws 
from the Australian market. Through a series of measures including time spent with different 
media, advertising revenue for different media by market share, main sources of news, and 
online news sites accessed in Australia, the Review concludes that ‘traditional media remains 
[sic] dominant’ with television in particular considered the ‘most significant content service’ 
(Convergence Review 2012, 8). These findings, coupled with the high thresholds of users per 
month (500,000) and revenue ($50m p.a. of ‘Australian-sourced content service revenue’ 
(Convergence Review 2012, 12)), mean that only a limited number of very large media 
companies appear likely to qualify as CSEs and therefore become subject to media diversity 
and Australian and local content regulations.   
 
Of the fifteen companies that qualify as CSEs under the thresholds proposed in the Final 
Report, two are principally print and news media providers (Fairfax Media and APN News 
and Media), four are principally radio broadcasters (DMG Radio Australia, Australian Radio 
Network, Macquarie Radio Network, and Grant Broadcasters), one is a radio and television 
broadcaster (Southern Cross Austereo), one is the local subsidiary of a global media 
behemoth (News Limited), and seven are principally television broadcasters (Foxtel, Austar, 
[5] WIN Corporation, Ten Network Holdings, Prime Media, Seven West Media, Nine 
Entertainment).  This indicative list of companies is drawn from research commissioned by 
the Review from PricewaterhouseCoopers that has not been made public. The Final Report 
contains a graphic (Convergence Review 2012, 12) illustrating the proposed thresholds and 
the relative positions of the aforementioned companies, together with three that narrowly 
failed to qualify.  While Google comfortably surpasses the threshold for estimated total 
monthly audience/users in Australia, it appears to fail by some distance to reach the revenue 
threshold.  Telstra is closer to the revenue threshold, but still below it, while also falling some 
distance below the threshold of users.  The third of the also-rans, Apple, appears on this 
evidence to be well short of both thresholds.  
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The Final Report does not explain how the thresholds were determined, or provide details on 
actual figures or information on how data on revenue and use for the companies concerned 
was gathered. The Review anticipates that the new communications regulator will determine 
the initial threshold levels of revenue and users, and will periodically review them. The 
reporting requirements for likely CSEs and for those that might become CSEs in the future 
are not specified. In this case at least, the Review provides no real guidance as to how 
‘principles-based regulation’ might be translated into the dreary business of collecting public 
revenue and ensuring compliance.  Given the complexity and trans-national character of the 
new media industries, this promises to be a time-consuming, contested, and complicated 
research and assessment task for the new regulator.  
 
The requirement that an enterprise ‘have control over the content supplied’ (Convergence 
Review 2012, 10) permits internet service and telecommunications providers to avoid 
classification as a CSE except where they have direct interests in (ie. control over) content 
provision as distinct from simply providing access to a service. The Final Report also places 
heavy emphasis on the production and control of ‘professional content’ as a determinant of 
CSE status. The explicit exclusion of user-generated content from regulation also excludes 
those enterprises whose principal business is hosting such content, although it is suggested 
that the growing practice of partnerships between enterprises like YouTube and ‘professional 
content providers’ means that in the future these enterprises might qualify as CSEs should 
their revenues and reach meet the thresholds set by the regulator. 
 
One immediate problem here is that the distinction between ‘professional’ and ‘user-
generated’ content provider is often not nearly as clear-cut as the Final Report seems to imply. 
Much will depend on the definition of ‘professional content’ adopted by the regulator. The 
Final Report is not enormously helpful in this regard, with the only attempt at a definition 
coming in a lengthy quotation from the ACMA’s report Digital Australians (ACMA 2011b), 
the nub of which is that ‘Content produced by traditional media organisations – whether for 
print or broadcast, and whether offline or online – was seen [by most research participants] as 
professional content, produced for broad audiences’ (quoted in Convergence Review 2012, 5).  
That is to say, one of the core determinants of a company’s status as a CSE, and therefore one 
of the core determinants of regulation intended, amongst other things, to secure the future 
production and supply of a broad range of Australian and local content, is whether an 
enterprise is a traditional media organisation that produces traditional media content.  It is 
difficult to see how this could meet the Review’s brief to create a future-proof regulatory 
framework.  
 
One other proposal that will likely have significant implications for Australian and local 
content production and supply is Recommendation 29 that the new communications regulator 
allocate channel capacity on the sixth planned digital television multiplex (commonly known 
as the ‘sixth channel’) to new and innovative services, and to community broadcasters. The 
Final Report also recommends that existing commercial free-to-air and public service 
broadcasters not be permitted to obtain any of this spectrum, which in concert with 
Recommendations 2 and 28 [6] would effectively ends the long-standing moratorium on new 
commercial broadcasting services entering the free-to-air market.  
 
Among a series of recommendations specifically relating to Australian content regulation, the 
Final Report proposes a short-term increase in the quotas and minimum expenditure 
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obligations for drama, documentary and children’s content applying to free-to-air and 
subscription broadcasters before they are ultimately phased out and replaced with an 
expenditure levy. Qualifying CSEs will be required to invest a percentage of total revenue 
earned from ‘professional television-like content’ (with a level of 3-4% suggested) either 
directly in the production of Australian drama, documentary or children’s content, or as a 
contribution to a new Converged Content Production Fund (Convergence Review 2012, 68).  
This fund will be supplemented by direct appropriations from government, and spectrum fees 
paid by radio and television broadcasters. The likely amounts of these appropriations and fees 
are uncertain, and it is also unclear who will administer the fund. While the most obvious 
candidate is Screen Australia, a number of submissions to the Review registered concerns 
about the agency’s transparency and allocation of existing funds. 
 
The Converged Content Production Fund is one of three measures intended to support 
innovative and interactive content, along with Recommendation 17, to create an interactive 
entertainment tax offset similar to the existing Producer Offset scheme, and Recommendation 
29, to open up the sixth channel for new and innovative services. However, the Final Report 
proposes that the Fund’s primary roles will also be to support the production by the 
independent production sector of drama, documentary and children’s content, the production 
of local and regional programming, and contemporary music. Coupled with the reasonable 
expectation that most CSEs will choose to invest in content production themselves rather than 
contribute to the Fund (in order to acquire intellectual property rights and therefore potentially 
benefit from future exploitation of that content), and the much-reduced spectrum access fee, 
the Converged Content Production Fund may not only have to spread its investment across a 
broad range of content types and genres, but also will have extremely limited funds to invest 
overall. 
 
As a transitional measure, the Final Report recommends (Recommendation 18) that the 
existing 55% transmission quota for free-to-air commercial broadcasters be retained and 
supplemented with a 50% increase in the sub-quota obligations for drama, documentary and 
children’s content. While a free-to-air broadcaster could choose to fulfill all of its new 
obligations on its main channel, the increase in the sub-quotas is a direct response to the 
limited volume of Australian content on the two additional channels operated by each free-to-
air commercial broadcaster. The 10% minimum expenditure requirement for drama on 
subscription television is also to be retained in the interim, with the addition of a new 10% 
minimum expenditure requirement for documentary and children’s channels on subscription 
services. Under Recommendation 26, the ABC will also be subject to the 55% overall 
Australian content quota on its primary television channel ABC1, with the other public 
service broadcaster, SBS, required to broadcast 22.5% Australian content. These requirements 
and Recommendation 25 (to update the ABC and SBS charters) have long been demanded by 
the commercial broadcasters, and could be considered to be preparatory measures in 
anticipation of the imposition of the ‘uniform content scheme’. In reality, however, the 
‘uniform content scheme’ is nothing of the sort, since it only applies to those CSEs with both 
‘significant revenues from television-like content’ and interests in drama, documentary or 
children’s content (Convergence Review 2012, xi). It is unclear whether or not the ABC and 
SBS will be treated as CSEs for Australian content purposes in the future. 
 
Drama, documentary and children’s content are the only specifically protected program 
genres, due to the expectation that they ‘will continue to be the most significant forms of 
programming in the short to medium term’ (Convergence Review 2012, 59). No evidence is 
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offered to justify this claim. Regulatory protections for these genres will also be maintained 
on the grounds of ‘market failure’; that is, without such support, these genres would be 
‘under-produced’ as commercial providers would simply look to program low cost/high 
return content, much of which would be likely to be sourced from overseas. 
   
The emphasis placed in the Final Report on conventional genres, coupled with the adoption, 
virtually in toto, of Screen Australia’s proposals for future Australian content regulation in its 
October 2011 submission, suggest that the Review’s principal concern is not to maintain or 
adapt the social and cultural objectives of the previous framework to the convergent media 
environment. Instead, the Review is concerned with extending the model built around 
commercial television broadcasting, in order to ensure the sustainability of the traditional 
content production industry. The concerns of one well-established, highly articulate quarter of 
the digital media production sector may well be legitimate, worthy and defensible. They are 
also inevitably self-interested, and should invite careful scrutiny. Here they have prevailed, 
without extended analysis or investigation of the alternatives, or the consequences. The risk is 
that this will be at the expense of a flexible system that can respond rapidly to industry change 
and properly account for and nurture the dynamism emerging in the games, interactive, 
informal or semi-professional production sectors.  
 
The interests of audiences and users of Australian content have also been left behind by the 
proposed framework. The eventual repeal of the overall transmission quota on free-to-air 
television not only removes the incentive for breadth and diversity of content, it also abolishes 
the requirement that certain kinds of Australian content be screened in prime time, or 
children’s time, or indeed at any time. That is to say, the repeal of the quotas abandons the 
distribution guarantee inherent in the previous system, and opens up the possibility for 
Australian content to be marginalised in the schedule or on the menu. The proposal is 
essentially an extrapolation to the whole system of the pay television production quota, 
which, for all the problems it has raised as a somewhat arbitrary quid pro quo, nevertheless 
possessed some logic in terms of the repetitive programming practices of pay TV channels. In 
the free to view environment, it is very hard to see how this model can be presented as 
cultural or social policy. It is not sufficient to argue in response that the availability of catch-
up services on the internet renders the concept of prime time redundant, or that audiences will 
be able to watch Australian content at their leisure. These are insufficient arguments because 
there is no certainty that broadcasters will maintain freely accessible internet-based catch-up 
services, or that all content on those services will be available to all Australians. On this 
question of distribution and availability, the review’s industry support focus diverges from the 
longstanding cultural and social objectives of broadcasting policy.  
 
In radio, after avoiding the issue of Australian music quotas until the Final Report, the 
Review ultimately recommends that the quotas will continue to apply to analog radio services, 
and be extended to digital-only radio services, as long as these services are offered by a 
content service enterprise (Recommendation 19).  Music quotas will not be applied to 
occasional or temporary digital radio services (Recommendation 20), or internet-based music 
services (Recommendation 21). The continuation of music quotas will be welcomed by the 
Australian music industry, but the proposal as it stands will potentially reduce the overall 
amount of Australian music played on radio across the country. This is because radio stations 
owned by groups or entities that do not qualify as CSEs will no longer be subject to the 
Australian music quotas. While the requirement may ensure that stations owned by CSEs will 
likely maintain their share of Australian music, it is reasonable to assume that the absence of 
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equivalent requirements for smaller stations will result in an overall drop in the total volume 
of Australian music. 
 
In terms of local content, the Final Report recommends that ‘commercial free-to-air television 
and radio broadcasters using spectrum should continue to devote a specified amount of 
programming to matters of local significance’ (Recommendation 22). Currently, television 
broadcasters must comply with a points system, which requires the broadcast of 
approximately six hours of local news or twelve hours of other locally significant material 
over a six-week period, with at least 45 minutes of local news or 90 minutes of other locally 
significant material broadcast every week. Radio broadcasters must broadcast minimum 
amounts of locally significant material, with the actual amount varying depending on the type 
of service and licence held. Some regional commercial radio broadcasters are also required to 
broadcast local news, weather, community service announcements and emergency warnings, 
albeit only after a ‘trigger event’ such as a takeover or merger.  The Final Report does not 
specify the new requirements for regional radio broadcasters, except to note that it expects 
that ‘these requirements will vary considerably from region to region based on community 
needs and circumstances’ (Convergence Review 2012, 82). The requirements for holders of 
spectrum licences for television will also vary. The new regulator will set the ‘nature and 
quantum of local content obligations’ at some unspecified point in the future. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Convergence Review has made a serious new attempt to address the digital media 
landscape. In the field of Australian content, proposals such as the plan for a production fund 
supporting innovation deserve serious consideration. However, in our opinion the Review 
suffers from an overly cautious approach to the problem of rapid change. Its focus on the 
immediate agenda of the established Australian production sector rather than the opportunities 
genuinely arising from new platforms and services represents a lost opportunity. In a period 
of disruption and volatility in all sectors of the digital economy, the claims of the local 
professional production industry, however worthy, should no longer serve as a proxy for a 
forward-looking cultural and social policy.    
 
One further aspect of concern for professional and scholarly readers of the Review concerns 
its knowledge base. Unlike other inquiries in the field, including the recent Independent 
Media Inquiry and the ALRC Classification review, the Final Report of the Convergence 
Review, along with the various interim documents, is notably thin in terms of argument, 
evidence and analysis. There is a perfunctory tone to the exposition, as if the conclusions 
were manifestly inevitable and incontrovertible. Neither the draft nor final reports respond in 
detail to the substantial volume of submissions put to the review. Positions which have 
significant implications for the overall recommendations — such as the special valorisation of 
drama — are presented without consideration of alternative views, or any weighing of the 
evidence. Finally, it is worrying that relevant academic research and analysis, which was 
extensively drawn upon in the Finkelstein report, and somewhat less so in the ALRC report, is 
virtually invisible in the Convergence Review.   
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ENDNOTES  
 
[1] Average production cost per hour (AUD$ millions) for particular forms of Australian 
content: 
Form 2000/01 2009/10 
Drama series/serials 0.32 0.35 
Miniseries 1.52 1.01 
Telemovies 1.74 1.68 
Children’s Drama 0.67 0.66 
Source: Screen Australia ‘Australian TV drama hours produced and costs per hour by format, 
2000/01–2009/10’. Accessed 29 May2012. Available from: 
http://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/research/statistics/mptvdramahoursxformat.asp 
 
[2] Quoting figures collated by Screen Australia and reported in its October 2011 submission, 
the Review (2011a: 8) notes that the indicative production cost of one hour of new release 
American drama for free-to-air television ranges from AUD$2.5 million to over AUD$5 
million, while the same figure for Australian adult drama series over the last three years is 
between AUD$400,000 and AUD$1.8 million.  The indicative cost to Australian broadcasters 
to licence one hour of American drama is between AUD$100,000-400,000, while the cost of 
licencing or investing in one hour of Australian drama is between AUD$350,000-1.4 million. 
 
[3] See for example the submissions in response to the Interim Report by Foxtel (2012); the 
joint submission by AIMIA, Google, Telstra, Facebook, Yahoo! and ninemsn (2012); the 
Australian Industry Group (2012); the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2012); and the joint submission by iiNet, TransACT Communications, Internode and Adam 
Internet (2012). 
 
[4] These findings support those of the CCI Digital Futures 2010 report by Scott Ewing and 
Julian Thomas, which reported that over 59% of people aged 18-29 downloaded or watched 
online video content at least weekly in 2009 (Ewing and Thomas 2010, figure 4.25: 33). 
 
[5] The Final Report was released prior to approval being granted by the Australian Consumer 
and Competition Commission for the takeover of Austar by Foxtel. 
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[6] Recommendation 2: ‘There should be no licensing or any similar barrier to market entry 
for the supply of content or communications services, except where necessary to manage use 
of a finite resource such as radiocommunications spectrum’. 
Recommendation 28: ‘Existing holders of commercial broadcasting licences should have their 
apparatus licences replaced by spectrum licences to enable them to continue existing services. 
In addition: 
a)  as broadcasting licence fees will be abolished with the removal of broadcasting 
licences, the regulator should set an annual spectrum access fee based on the value of the 
spectrum as planned for broadcast use; 
b)  commercial broadcasting licensees should have the flexibility to trade channel 
capacity within their spectrum.’ 
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